|
Applicability
of the Crime of Apartheid to Israel
by Karine Mac Allister
Al-Majdal Magazine
BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and
Refugee Rights
Issue No. 38 (Summer
2008)
http://www.badil.org/al-majdal/2008/summer/articles02.htm
Apartheid is an
Afrikaans term for "apartness," which means to
"separate," to "put apart," to "segregate." It can
be summed up as the institutionalization of a regime
of systematic racial discrimination or more
precisely, "a political system where racism is
regulated in law through acts of parliament."1
Discussions
on whether Israel is guilty of the crime of
apartheid are not new; numerous articles were
published in the 1980s and 1990s concluding that the
situation in Israel and to some extent the occupied
Palestinian territory (OPT) is one of apartheid.2
These discussions were, however, sidelined by the
Madrid-Oslo process in the mid-1990s, which was
widely expected to bring about at least partial
self-determination of the Palestinian people in the
OPT. Discussions on the applicability of the
apartheid label to Israel have recently re-emerged,
mainly as a result of the entrenchment of Israel's
regime of occupation and colonization in the OPT and
its continued discriminatory policies towards
Palestinian refugees and citizens of Israel.3
While several political and historical comparisons
between Israel and South Africa have been published,
there has been no systematic legal analysis of
Israeli apartheid as it affects all sectors of
Palestinian society: Palestinians in the occupied
territory, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and
Palestinian refugees. This article is a work in
progress which aims to provide a legal framework
within which the applicability of the crime of
apartheid to Israel can be discussed. It argues that
the policies and practices of the Israeli government
amount to apartheid against Palestinian nationals -
wherever they are and whatever their legal status.
Hence, Palestinian citizens of Israel, refugees, and
those in the OPT are victims, albeit in different
ways, of Israel's regime of apartheid.
While this article is limited to the applicability
of the crime of apartheid, it does not negate nor
contradict the fact that Israel's regime against the
Palestinian people is also one of belligerent
occupation and colonialism. Indeed, Israel's
obligations as an occupying power in the OPT, in
particular to end its belligerent occupation and
withdraw from the occupied territory, are not
affected by the applicability of the crime of
apartheid; to the contrary, they are heightened, as
are the obligations of the international community.
Hence, victims of the crime of apartheid,
Palestinians are not only protected civilians in the
OPT, but also a people - i.e., Palestinian nationals
- victims of gross violations of international human
rights law (i.e., apartheid and colonialism) and
entitled to reparations, including return,
restitution, compensation, and satisfaction.
Colonialism, the "subjection of peoples to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation"4 is thus
core to any analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. The conflict is colonial because it is
rooted in political Zionism which aims to Judaize
Palestine by creating a Jewish majority over Mandate
Palestine - or more expansively, Eretz Israel.5 At
the heart of Zionism is thus an exclusivist project:
the creation of a Jewish state for the Jewish
people. Such a project involves or necessitates the
denial of the other; of their presence, rights and
existence on the land and reconstruction of the
past, namely that the land was empty before the
advent of Zionist settlement, hence the movement's
slogan describing "a land without people for a
people without land."6 In its practical
implementation, Zionism translates into a
sophisticated legal, social, economic and political
regime of racial discrimination that has led to
colonialism and apartheid as well as the
dispossession and displacement of the Palestinian
people. In this sense, apartheid - the separation of
the indigenous people from their lands on the one
hand, and from Jewish Israelis on the other -
permits the colonial enterprise that is inherent to
political Zionism.
The Crime of Apartheid under International Law
Apartheid violates a jus cogens norm of
international law and is a crime against humanity.7
Central to the definition of apartheid is the
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid (hereinafter the Apartheid
Convention) which defines apartheid as "similar
policies and practices of racial segregation and
discrimination as practiced in southern Africa"
which have "the purpose of establishing and
maintaining domination by one racial group of
persons over any other racial group of persons and
systematically oppressing them." While the
Convention is based on the South African experience,
it is not limited to it.8 In its General Comment,
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination further explained that while "the
reference to apartheid may have been directed
exclusively to South Africa... the article
[condemning racial segregation and apartheid] as
adopted prohibits all forms of racial segregation in
all countries."9
The Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination broadly defines racial discrimination
as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, color, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of
public life."10 The Apartheid Convention also
defines apartheid as violations of international law
perpetrated by one racial group against another in
order to obtain and maintain supremacy - or in other
terms, "all those activities and practices which are
intended to protect the advantages of a dominant
group and/or to maintain or widen the unequal
position of a subordinate group."11 Central to the
logic of apartheid is "[disaggregation of] the other
along ethnically defined lines so as to divide and
rule."12In this sense, apartheid is one of the most
severe forms of racism.
The crime of apartheid includes denial of the right
to life and liberty, such as murder, serious bodily
or mental harm, infringement of freedom or dignity,
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment and arbitrary arrest and illegal
imprisonment. It also includes the deliberate
imposition on a racial group or groups of living
conditions calculated to cause its or their physical
destruction in whole or in part, exploitation of
labor, including forced labor, and persecution of
organizations and persons who oppose apartheid.13
In addition, apartheid is
"any legislative
measures and other measures calculated to prevent a
racial group or groups from participation in the
political, social, economic and cultural life of the
country and the deliberate creation of conditions
preventing the full development of such a group or
groups, in particular by denying to members of a
racial group or groups basic human rights and
freedoms, including the right to work, the right to
form recognized trade unions, the right to
education, the right to leave and to return to their
country, the right to a nationality, the right to
freedom of movement and residence, the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and association."14
Lastly, apartheid
includes
"any measures, including
legislative measures, designed to divide the
population along racial lines by the creation of
separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a
racial group or groups, the prohibition of mixed
marriages among members of various racial groups,
the expropriation of landed property belonging to a
racial group or groups or to members thereof."15
Under international
humanitarian law, the first Additional Protocol to
the Geneva Conventions also includes as grave
breaches "practices of apartheid and other inhuman
and degrading practices involving outrages upon
personal dignity, based on racial discrimination."16
Under international criminal law, apartheid is
clearly recognized as a crime against humanity when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against civilian population, i.e., inhumane
acts that are massive in scale or result from
deliberate and systematic planning. The Rome Statute
defines apartheid as inhumane acts "committed in the
context of an institutionalized regime of systematic
oppression and domination by one racial group over
any other racial group or groups and committed with
the intention of maintaining that regime." These
acts can include deportation or forcible transfer of
population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation
of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law, torture, persecution
against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under
international law and other inhumane acts of a
similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health."17
The Apartheid Convention includes one of the most
expansive definitions of international criminal
jurisdiction and enforcement.18 The Convention
stipulates that "international criminal
responsibility shall apply, irrespective of the
motive involved, to individuals, members of
organizations and institutions and representatives
of the State, whether residing in the territory of
the State in which the acts are perpetrated or in
some other State, whenever they: a) Commit,
participate in, directly incite or conspire in the
commission of the acts mentioned in article II of
the present Convention; b) Directly abet, encourage
or co-operate in the commission of the crime of
apartheid."19 The universal jurisdiction granted by
the Convention enables the prosecution of
individuals, members of organizations and agents of
the state, who can be held criminally liable
regardless of their location and their motive, and
whether they encourage, cooperate with, or directly
commit actions or omissions as part of the crime of
apartheid.20
Applicability of the Crime of Apartheid to Israel
Defining Racial Groups
Central to the definition of apartheid is the
institutionalized - "legalized" - domination of one
racial group over another. An examination of whether
the policies and practices of the government of
Israel amount to apartheid first requires a
definition what is intended by the term ‘racial
group' and who are the racial groups in the context
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Can we say that
Palestinians and Jews are racial groups, and if so,
who is included in these groups? Are all the
Palestinians and Jews members of a racial group or
only a limited number of them?

The concepts of ‘race' and ‘racial' have evolved
from a biologically-driven definition to one that
"stand[s] for historically specific forms of
cultural connectedness and solidarity."21
"Race serves to naturalize the groupings that it
identifies in its own name."22
"While the reality of ‘race' is indeed neither
natural and biological, nor psychological... it does
nevertheless exist" because "it does kill people"
and "continues to provide the backbone of some
ferocious systems of domination."23
According to Colette Guillaumin, race is a "legal,
political and historical reality which plays a real
and constraining role in a number of societies"
which explains why "any appeal to race... is a
political move."24
The term ‘ethnic group' has been defined by Max
Weber as "those human groups that entertain a
subjective belief in their common descent because of
similarities of physical type or of customs or both,
or because of memories of colonization and
migration; this belief must be important for group
formation; furthermore it does not matter whether an
objective blood relationship exists."25
In some instances, ‘ethnic group' has replaced or
been used interchangeably with ‘racial group'
although this practice is not accepted by all.26
In practice, however, the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination uses ‘racial
group' or ‘ethnic group' interchangeably. Hence the
definitions of and differences between a racial and
ethnic group are malleable and have blurred. For the
purpose of this article, they are used
interchangeably based on the assumption that both
concepts are constructed identities developed as a
result of perceived common cultural, national,
religious, descent or biological traits.
The definition of a ‘racial' or ‘ethnic' group
primarily results from individual
self-identification, which requires voluntary and
conscious choice. Indeed, the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination is of the
opinion that "the ways in which individuals are
identified as being members of a particular racial
or ethnic groups... shall, if no justification
exists to the contrary, be based upon
self-identification by the individual concerned."27
The victims of apartheid, in the Israeli case, are
the Palestinian people, namely persons belonging to
the Palestinian nation. For Palestinians, the test
is whether they identify themselves as Palestinian
nationals. If they do, and regardless of their
geographic location or legal status, they constitute
one ‘racial' or ‘ethnic' group because of their
shared identity, which for instance includes a
common culture, history and origin. Whether
Palestinians are citizens of Israel, refugees and/or
protected persons in the OPT is irrelevant, as long
as they identify themselves as Palestinians. Hence,
Palestinians are an ethno-national group based on
their voluntary self-identification as Palestinian
nationals.
|
Administering Apartheid
In addition
to one's self-identification,
identification with a ‘racial' or
‘ethnic' group can result from the
projected perceptions of ‘the other'
such as the state or another ‘racial' or
‘ethnic' group. By projecting or
imposing its perceptions of ‘the other,'
the individual, state or other racial
group constructs its identity, and with
it the identity of ‘the other.' As
Richard Jenkins explains, "identity is
our understanding of who we are and of
who other people are, and reciprocally,
other people's understanding of
themselves and of others (which include
us)."28
In that
sense, group or collective identity is
not a unilateral process because "all
identities (individual and collective)
are constituted by the process of
internal-external dialectic of
identification."
29
In the context of an apartheid regime,
this identification of ‘the other' takes
on an added bureaucratic form to
facilitate the administration of
discriminatory legislation, policy and
practice.
In the
context of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, Palestinians are also
racialized through the construction and
projection of racial Palestinianization
by Zionist Jewish Israelis through the
state of Israel. Palestinians are
"treated as a racial group, not simply
in the manner of a racial group, but as
a despised and demonic racial group."30
In contrast, Jewish "Israelis occupy the
structural position of whiteness in the
racial hierarchy of the Middle East."31
On the legal and administrative level,
the definition of who is a Palestinian
national is for instance imposed through
Israeli control of the population
registry in Israel and the OPT. This
control allows Israel to define who is a
Palestinian - namely, a ‘non-Jew,'
(i.e., Arab), ‘absentee' or
‘present-absentee.' In Israel, the state
has maintained a registry of
Palestinians by incorporating the
differentiation between ‘Jews' and
‘Arabs' into the bureaucracy governing
its citizens, a differentiation that was
clearly marked on the Identity Cards
issued by the state to its citizens
until 2002.32 The change came
not as a result of a desire to end
systematic discrimination against
Palestinian citizens, but because of
disagreements within the Jewish
religious establishment of who
constitutes a Jew.33 As a
result, citizens'
‘nationality' was no longer marked on
state-issued ID cards, but Palestinians
are still identified as ‘Arab' on their
birth certificates as well as in the
records of the Israeli Ministry of
Interior. More simply put, "Israel does
not have one single universal
citizenship for all of its citizens."34
In the OPT (except Jerusalem35),
the military ‘civil' administration
controls the population registry and
ultimately, whether the Palestinian
Authority can issue Palestinian ID cards
to residents of the OPT. Hence, through
laws, practices and policies the state
of Israel has established a hierarchy of
statuses affecting all Palestinian
nationals.
Israel’s Hierarchy of Statuses
|
|
Identity |
Citizenship/ID |
Legal
status with regard to their
land |
Mobility
access to land |
|
Status A |
Jewish Israelis |
Israeli citizenship |
|
No access to Area A in OPT |
|
Status B |
Palestinian citizens of
Israel |
Israeli citizenship |
|
No access to Area A in OPT |
|
Status C |
Palestinians IDPs in Israel |
Israeli
citizenship |
present
absentee |
No access
to Area A in OPT |
|
Status D |
Palestinian residents of
occupied east Jerusalem |
Jerusalem ID |
|
Restricted access within OPT |
|
Status E |
Palestinian refugees
resident in occupied east
Jerusalem |
Jerusalem
ID |
Absentee |
Restricted
access within OPT |
|
Status F |
Palestinian residents of the
occupied West Bank |
West Bank
ID |
Governed
by PA |
No access
beyond OPT |
|
Status G |
Palestinian residents of the
occupied Gaza Strip |
Gaza ID |
Governed
by PA |
No access
beyond OPT |
|
Status H |
Palestinians internally
displaced in the OPT |
West Bank
or Gaza ID |
Absentee
|
No access
to the lands in the OPT from
which displaced |
|
Status I |
Palestinian refugees in OPT |
West Bank
or Gaza ID |
Absentee |
No access
to lands in Israel from
which displaced |
|
Status J |
Palestinian refugees outside
historic Palestine |
determined
by country of residence/
citizenship |
Absentee |
No access
to historic Palestine
(unless granted tourist
visas on foreign passports) |
|
In the case of the dominant group and perpetrators
of apartheid, the test is based on whether people
identify themselves as Jewish citizens of Israel and
Zionists. Jews are all considered Israeli nationals
under the peculiar extraterritorial definition of
nationality as defined and applied by the state of
Israel, although there is significant social and
economic discrimination against non-European Jewish
Israelis that is beyond the scope of this article.
Not all Jews, however, have exercised their
privilege and acquired Israeli citizenship. Hence,
not all people of Jewish faith can be considered
part of one racial or ethnic group in the context of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite the fact
that the state of Israel projects itself as the
representative of Jews around the world. Hence, only
those who have voluntarily become Israeli citizens
and adhere to Israel's political ideology, Zionism,
constitute the relevant ‘racial' or ‘ethnic' group
in this context. Political Zionism -
"the transformation of Palestine, in whole or in
part, into the Jewish Land of Israel (Eretz
Israel),
through the dispossession and mass transfer of the
native indigenous Palestinian Arab population out of
Palestine, and the establishment, through the Jewish
colonization of Palestine, of a sovereign Jewish
state" - is the heart of the legal, political and
historical reality of the state of Israel,36
a state controlled by Zionist Jewish Israelis.
Hence, the common element of this ethno-national
group is self-identification as Jewish Israeli and
Zionist.
While Jewish Israeli society can be considered
complicit in the commission of the crime of
apartheid through funding the state apparatus with
their tax moneys, service in the Israeli military
and other institutions involved in the commission of
the crime, and otherwise, Jewish Israelis who have
opposed Zionism and recognize Palestinian rights
cannot be held to the same level of accountability.
Furthermore, including Zionist political ideology in
our analysis of the perpetrators of apartheid
enables us to distinguish the increased
responsibility of those who have consciously chosen
to implement their right to Israeli citizenship
through Israel's
Law of Return
as well as those who have actively sought to
perpetuate the commission of apartheid through work
and membership in institutions complicit in this
commission, particularly in the fields of
governmental and military decision-making. A
framework incorporating supporters of Zionism as
guilty parties in the crime of apartheid also
enables us to hold international actors who have
supported the Zionist project, such as Christian
Zionist groups, accountable for encouraging and
cooperating with the racial group that has
implemented the policies and practices constituting
the crime of apartheid.
Hence, for the purpose of the applicability of the
crime of apartheid to the state of Israel, the two
relevant ‘racial or ethnic' groups are Palestinian
nationals and Zionist Jewish Israelis.
Apartheid across the Green Line and Boundaries
Zionist Jewish Israelis, the group that forms and
controls the Israeli government, has ‘legalized' a
system of institutionalized racial discrimination
against Palestinian nationals which intends to
establish and maintain domination of Zionist Jewish
Israelis over Palestinian nationals. Although the
legal status of the territory of Israel and the OPT
differ, some of the most fundamental laws and
institutions of Israel are applied to and work in
both areas indiscriminately, affecting all
Palestinian nationals, including those who have been
displaced outside the boundaries of these areas,
i.e. refugees. As Miloon Kothari, former UN special
rapporteur on the right to housing, concluded
"essentially, the institutions, laws and practices
that Israel had developed to dispossess the
Palestinians (now Israeli citizens) inside its 1948
border (the Green Line) have been applied with
comparable effect in the areas occupied since 1967."37
While the following section deals with the
geographic continuity of Israel's crime of apartheid
in that it affects Palestinian nationals regardless
of their location, it is important to note that
particular apartheid laws, policies and practices
listed in the Apartheid Convention and violated by
Israel often have different effects on different
segments of the Palestinian group. For instance,
denial of the right of return (listed as an
apartheid policy and practice in Article II(c) of
the Apartheid Convention) disproportionately targets
Palestinian refugees and internally displaced
persons whether they live in a refugee camp in
Lebanon or Gaza or in a city near their original
village in Israel; while the restrictions of
Palestinian freedom of movement prevent citizens of
Israel from entering Gaza and "Area A" in the West
Bank and Palestinian with West Bank ID from crossing
the Green Line and moving within the OPT. A central
point to keep in mind in what follows is that
regardless of the variation in the ways in which
Israeli apartheid affects different segments of the
Palestinian population, since it is the same state
operating on behalf of the Zionist Jewish Israeli
group that is implementing these laws, policies and
practices with the clear goal of establishing and
maintaining the domination of that group in Israel
and the OPT, then it is inaccurate to consider the
violations as limited to one area; a mistake made by
many in limiting their analysis of Israeli apartheid
to a particular geographic area or a particular
segment of Palestinian society. As Oren Yiftachel
argues, the "common scholarly and political attempts
to portray the existence of Israel proper within the
Green Line, as "Jewish and democratic," are hence
both analytically flawed and politically deceiving."38
He suggests that "the entire area under Israeli
control - that is, Israel/Palestine between river
and sea - should be analyzed as one
political-geographic unit."
39
Central to such an analysis are the people displaced
and denied return to this political-geographic unit.
The
systematic
nature of racial discrimination - the intent and
plan to distinguish, exclude, dominate, and oppress
on grounds of nationality - is embodied in a number
of Israeli laws, policies and practices driven by
political Zionism. Among these laws, policies and
practices are the numerous plans of population
transfer developed by Zionist Jewish Israelis to
transfer - either internally or externally -
Palestinian nationals from Israel and the OPT and
prevent the return of those who have been displaced.40
These plans include Plan Dalet, the military
plan implemented in 1948 which aimed to expand the
Jewish areas beyond those allocated by the United
Nations in the 1947 Partition Plan (Resolution 181)
and remove Arab/Palestinian presence from these
areas; the Allon Plan, which aimed to annex as much
Palestinian land as possible immediately after the
1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the
central motto of which was "maximum security and
maximum territory for Israel with the minimum
Arabs"; and, the Dayan Plan, which aimed to
facilitate Israel's control over lands in the OPT
and developed by Moshe Dayan, who explained "it is
also important for ourselves to emphasize that we
are not foreigners in the west Bank. Judea and
Samaria is Israel and we are not there as foreign
conquerors but as returners to Zion."41
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine
the entire regime that sustains apartheid in Israel
and the occupied Palestinian territory. It suffices
to say that a number of laws, policies and practices
fundamental to the state of Israel amount to
systematic institutionalized racial discrimination
for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the
superiority of Zionist Jewish Israelis over
Palestinians.42
Among these laws is the 1950
Law of Return,
which stipulates that all Jews in the world are
considered nationals of the state and can acquire
Israeli citizenship.43 Palestinians
(non-Jews) are subject to the 1952
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law,
which limits eligibility for Israeli citizenship to
non-Jews who were present in the territory of Israel
between 1948 and 1952 and their descendents. This
law excludes and
de facto
de-nationalizes Palestinian refugees who were
displaced in 194844 while any Jew around
the world can "return" to "Israel,"
including the occupied Palestinian territory.
Combined, the Law of Return and the Citizenship Law
form the basis of a regime of systematic
discrimination; it creates a superior status- Jewish
nationals - and an inferior status - ‘non-Jews'
composed mainly of Palestinians. This regime
discriminates against Palestinians, in particular
Palestinian refugees, on grounds of nationality.
John Quigly concludes that "by discriminating
against the indigenous inhabitants, both those who
were displaced and those who were not, the two
statutes constitute apartheid legislation."45
In addition, the Israeli parliament, the Knesset,
recently passed the Ensuring Rejection of the Right
of Return Law, which provides that the refugees,
including those displaced in 1967 from the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, will not be returned unless approved
by an absolute majority of ministers.46
The Knesset has also passed a temporary amendment to
the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law which
suspends the possibility of granting Israeli
citizenship and residence permits in Israel,
including through family reunification, to residents
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.47
These more recent laws were passed with the intent
to maintain a demographic Jewish majority in Israel
and the OPT and to protect this advantage by denying
the rights of Palestinians to return and to family
reunification.
Moreover,
in the OPT, two legal systems apply. The Israeli
delegation at the review of the state of Israel by
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination verbally confirmed that two legal
regimes apply in the OPT: Jewish people are subject
to Israeli law (Israeli Basic Law) while
Palestinians are subject to a complex mixture of
Ottoman, British, Jordanian law and Israeli military
orders.48 In other words, Israel applies
Israeli law extra-territorially - wherever an
Israeli citizen goes in the OPT, Israeli law
follows. As Golda Meir said "the frontier [of
Israel] is where Jews live, not where there is a
line on the map."49
This reality creates a two tier legal system clearly
constituting discrimination on national grounds
against Palestinian nationals in and from the
occupied Palestinian territory.
Para-statal institutions such as the Jewish Agency
(JA) and the World Zionist Organization (WZO), which
includes the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the United
Israel Appeal, and other corporations or
institutions owned and controlled by the WZO50
and the governmental Israel Land Administration
ensure Jewish immigration and control and manage
approximately 92 percent51 of land in
Israel. These organizations are para-statal in that
"the exclusivist constitutional stipulations of the
WZO, JA and JNF (for Jews only) are incorporated
into the body of the laws of the State of Israel
through a detailed sequence of strategic Knesset
legislation..."52
The Constitution of the Jewish Agency stipulates
that "land is to be acquired as Jewish property
and... the title of the lands acquired is to be
taken in the name of the JNF to the end that the
same shall be held the inalienable property of the
Jewish people. The Agency shall promote agricultural
colonization based on Jewish labor, and in all works
or undertakings carried out or furthered by the
Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of
principle that Jewish labor shall be employed."53
The Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organization are
part of the state of Israel. Their mandate and
relationship is enshrined in the 1952
World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency Status
Law;
the 1953
Keren Kayemeth Leisrael (Jewish National Fund) Law;
the 1954
Covenant between the Government of Israel and the
Zionist Executive;
the 1961
Covenant between the Government of Israel and the
Jewish National Fund;
the 1971
Covenant between the State of Israel and the World
Zionist Organization.
The Israeli Knesset (parliament) and the WZO/JA
signed the 1952
World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency Status
Law,
which
stipulates:
"The
mission of gathering in the exiles, which is the
central task of the State of Israel and the Zionist
Movement in our days, requires constant effort by
the Jewish people in the Diaspora; the State of
Israel, therefore, expects the cooperation of all
Jews, as individuals and groups, in building up the
State and assisting the immigration to it of the
masses of the [Jewish] people..."54
The Memorandum of Association of the JNF as
incorporated in Israel in 1954 defines its primary
goal as "to purchase, acquire on lease or in
exchange, etc,... in the prescribed region (which
expression shall in this Memorandum mean the state
of Israel in any area within the jurisdiction of the
Government of Israel) or any part thereof,
for the purpose of settling Jews on such lands and
properties."55
The JA and WZO "enjoy a legal right to discriminate
in favor of Jews"56
because their control over the land ensures the
basis of the "national Jewish home" or
Eretz Israel.57
In a new Covenant between the Jewish Agency and
World Zionist Organization in 1971, a division of
labor on a geopolitical basis was agreed whereby the
JA is active in Israel whereas the WZO is active in
all member states of the UN and the OPT. "Subject to
this arrangement, the Settlement Division of the
WZO, funded by the government of Israel and/or by
non-tax-exempt donations, is active in the 1967
occupied territories, whereas the Israel department
of the JA, funded by various tax-exempt Zionist
appeals, is active inside the state of Israel."58
In the OPT, over 40 percent of the land in the
occupied West Bank is under the control of Jewish
settlements and related infrastructure, and no
longer accessible to Palestinians.59 It
is therefore undeniable that the Jewish Agency and
the World Zionist Organization operate in both
policy and practice for the exclusive benefit of
Jewish nationals in Israel and the OPT, and work as
para-statal organizations that implement and
administer apartheid policies and practices on
behalf of the Israeli state.
In order to acquire land, a number of laws and
measures were enacted. These include for instance
the 1943
Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance
and the 1950
Absentee Property Law.60
The latter allows the state to acquire the lands of
Palestinians displaced during the Nakba. Under this
law, displaced Palestinians are considered
‘absentees,' defined as any person, who before
September 1948, was out of the country in an area
under the control of the Arab League Forces, or who
had left his or her normal place of residence during
the period prescribed in the law, or who, between 29
November 1947 and the date of coming into effect of
this law, was otherwise deemed ‘absent.'61
While not overtly discriminatory, the term ‘person'
in the law is interpreted as not including Jews.62
This law applies to Palestinian refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDP) in Israel, who
are considered ‘present absentees' (physically
present but absent under the law). Lands confiscated
under this law were transferred to the state's
Custodian of Absentee Property. A similar regime
exists in the OPT, whereby confiscated lands are
transferred to the Custodian of Governmental and
Abandoned Property in Judea and Samaria (i.e.
occupied West Bank) under a number of military
orders such as the 1967
Military Order 58, Order Concerning Absentee
Property (Private Property).
Under this order "property whose legal owner, or
whoever is granted the power to control it by law,
left the area prior to 7 June 1967 or subsequently"63
is declared absentee or abandoned property. The
property is transferred to the Custodian who
acquires all rights previously vested with the
owner.64
"Theoretically and legally, the ‘Custodian' is
entrusted with protecting the property and assets of
‘absentees' until they return to reclaim their
rights. In practice, however, and because Israel has
consistently barred the repatriation of refugees,
the ‘Custodian' in the West Bank functions very
similarly to his counterpart inside Israel.
Essentially, the former facilities the transfer of
‘absentee properties' (especially lands) to Jewish
control and thus prevents the rightful Palestinian
owners from pressing claims to their own lands and
properties." 65
The 1950 Absentee Law and the Military Order 58,
Order Concerning absentee Property (Private
Property) violate the prohibition against the
expropriation of landed property belonging to a
racial group.66 In other words "Israeli legislation
excludes the indigenous population from the
settler's land but does not exclude the settlers
from the indigenous land."67
In addition to Israel's
apartheid legislation, the state also enforces
practices of physical separation and segregation.
For instance, the Israeli government has a policy of
house demolition and forced eviction of Palestinians
in Israel and the OPT, in particular in areas which
Israel aims to acquire, such as Area C, eastern
Jerusalem and the closed area between the Wall and
the Green Line in the West Bank, and the Naqab
(Negev), Jaffa and the Galilee.68 Miloon
Kothari, UN Special Rapporteur on housing, found
that "the demolitions ordered either for lack of
permit or another pretext have a military dimension
and a gratuitously cruel nature."69 The
Committee against Torture in its review of Israel
concurred and expressed concern that "Israeli
policies on house demolitions ... may, in certain
instances, amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."70 The policy of
the government of Israel to destroy Palestinian
houses clearly denies the right to dignity and
freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. In the OPT the Wall and its
associated regime clearly have the purpose and
effect of separating Jewish Israelis from
Palestinians, the acquisition of Palestinian lands
for Jewish-only colonies and related infrastructure
and the establishment of a Jewish majority on these
lands.71 The International Court of
Justice, a number of UN Human Rights treaty bodies,
independent experts and the International Committee
of the Red Cross concluded that the construction of
the Wall causes forced displacement and amounts to
population transfer.72
In Israel, Palestinians displaced beyond the borders
of the new state of Israel were intentionally and
systematically barred from returning. In the
1948-1966 period, Israel maintained and expanded on
the British Mandate system's emergency laws
directing them exclusively at the Palestinians who
managed to stay within the nascent state's borders.
These emergency laws involved restrictions to
mobility, arbitrary military governance that
involved the governance of the Palestinian citizens
under military laws while Jewish Israeli citizens
were governed under civil laws. The central aim of
these laws was clearing the land of its indigenous
inhabitants for the purpose of transferring title of
the land to the state and international Zionist
agencies.73 The policies and practices
used by Israel in the administration of Palestinians
in the OPT are a clear extension of the 1948-1966
military governance regime.
In
Israel, national planning laws and master plans have
a similar effect in particular in the Naqab, Jaffa
and the Galilee, where there are still large numbers
of Palestinians. For instance, Palestinian Bedouin
in the Naqab live in villages that predate the
establishment of the Israeli state but are
‘unrecognized' under the 1965 Planning and Building
Law. This law re-zoned communities and areas where
building and construction is permitted and rendered
illegal any building or habitations outside these
zones, and therefore subject to demolition.74
Israel does not provide these villages access to
basic services, frequently fumigates their lands
with poisonous chemicals and subjects the houses in
these areas to demolition, taking control of the
land for so-called Jewish development projects.75
The displaced residents are forced to relocate to
one of seven planned ‘concentration' towns- the
equivalent of reservations - where they are
circumscribed to minimum space, completely
inadequate for their nomadic and pastoral way of
life.76 In a recent report, Human Rights
Watch concluded that "discriminatory land and
planning policies have made it virtually impossible
for Bedouin to build legally where they live, and
also exclude them from the state's development plans
for the region. The state implements forced
evictions, home demolitions, and other punitive
measures disproportionately against Bedouin as
compared with actions taken regarding structures
owned by Jewish Israelis that do not conform to
planning law."77
According to Human Rights Watch, "the state's
motives for these discriminatory, exclusionary and
punitive policies can be elicited from policy
documents and official rhetoric. The state appears
intent on maximizing its control over Naqab land and
increasing the Jewish population in the area for
strategic, economic and demographic reasons."78
The policy of the state of Israel towards
Palestinians in Israel prevents their full
development by denying them their right to freedom
of residence and adequate standard of living and
amounts to policies and practices designed to divide
the population along racial or ethnic lines by the
creation of separate reserves for Palestinians.
In addition, the few ‘mixed' communities in Israel,
such as Ramle and Lydd, have walls and earth
embankments that separate the Jewish and Palestinian
residents. The municipalities and the Israeli
government often describe these separations as
"acoustic walls" aimed to prevent noise coming from
Palestinian neighborhoods, burglaries and the free
passage of drug addicts. They were however more
accurately described by the secretary of Moshav Zvi
as measures aimed to block both physical and eye
contact between the two communities.79
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination expressed deep concern about the fact
that Israel maintains separate "sectors" for Jews
and Palestinians and recommended that Israel assess
to which extent this may amount to racial
segregation and avoid separation of communities.80
Measures such as house demolition, forced
eviction and displacement, walls designed to divide
the population along ethnic or racial groups, the
result being the creation of separate reserves and
ghettos for Palestinian nationals thus violating the
Apartheid Convention.
Conclusion
Fundamental laws, policies and practices of the
Israeli government aim to establish and maintain
Zionist Jewish Israeli domination over Palestinian
nationals through the colonization of their lands
and resources. These laws, policies and practices
affect all Palestinian nationals, irrespective of
their location and status since at least the Nakba
of 1948. Hence, the crime of apartheid is applicable
to Israel over all of Israel and the OPT. The
ongoing exclusion of Palestinians from their homes,
lands and country through internal and external
displacement over the past 60 years has forced 70
percent of Palestinians to live as refugees and/or
IDPs; the largest and longest standing refugee and
IDP crises in the world today.
In order to challenge Israel's rejection of
international law as a valid framework capable of
bringing a lasting solution to the conflict and its
apartheid laws, policies and practices, it is
necessary to support the shift of the struggle from
the limited focus on the occupation of the OPT back
to its roots as a struggle against apartheid and
colonialism and occupation in all of mandate
Palestine. In other words, only reparations based on
an end to racial discrimination through the
institutionalization of justice will end the
conflict and bring peace. Uri Davis describes this
process as "the dismantlement of the state of Israel
as a Jewish state in the political Zionist sense of
the term, an apartheid state, and its replacement
with a democratic Palestine."81
Hence, the conflict will end when the colonizer and
colonized live together, in equality, in all of
Palestine. Until then, the racist and discriminatory
laws, policies and practices of the state of Israel
must be exposed and the government encouraged and
pressured to annul its apartheid and colonial laws,
policies and practices.
-----------------------
*Karine Mac Allister is the former Coordinator for
Legal Advocacy at Badil. We wish her all the best is
she begins her years as a doctoral candidate in
Montreal.
Endnotes
1.
Uri
Davis, Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for the
Struggle Within, Zed Books, London, 2003, p. 37.
2.
See
for instance John Quigly, “Apartheid Outside Africa:
The Case of Israel,” 2 Ind. International and
Comparative Law Review. 221, 1991-1992 or Uri Davis,
Israel: An Apartheid State, Zed Books,
London, 1987.
3.
“I
argue that the Oslo process was a turning point:
from then onward a dominant form of control has
emerged, which includes ghettoization, spatial
confinement and restriction of Palestinians to their
villages and towns.”Alina Korn, “The Ghettoization
of the Palestinians” in Thinking Palestine,
Ed. Ronit Lentin, Zed Books, London & New York,
2008, p. 116.
4.
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, UNGA Resolution 1514
(XV),14 December 1960, para. 1.
5.
Eretz Israel
is a varying geographical construct that extend to
parts of Jordan, Syria and Egypt and as far as Iraq
– often captured in the phrase 'from the Nile to the
Euphrates.’
The
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs writes “the State
of Israel is a Jewish state, first and foremost, in
view of the right of the Jewish people to a single
independent state of their own, and by reason of the
historic and biblical connection between the Jewish
people and the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel).” See
Israel, the Conflict and Peace: Answers to
frequently asked questions, November 2007, available
from:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfaIlan
Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine,
Oneworld, Oxford, 2007, pp. 10-15; Uri Davis,
Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for the Struggle
Within, Zed Books, London, 2003, p. 19;Oren
Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, Land and Identity
Politics in Israel/Palestine, University of
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, p.3; On creating
and maintaining a Jewish majority, see Jonathan
Cook, Blood and Religion, The Unmasking of the
Jewish and Democratic State, Pluto Press,
London, 2006, p. 100.
6.
See
Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians: The
Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought
1882-1948, Institute for Palestine Studies, US,
1992.
7.
See
Ronald C Slye, “Apartheid as a Crime Against
Humanity: A Submission to the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission,” 20 Michigan
Journal of International Law. 267, 1998-1999, p.
288-289.
8.
Roger
S. Clark, “Apartheid,” International Criminal
Law, Second Edition, Volume I, Edt. M. Cherif
Bassiouni, 1991, p. 643, 644.
9.
CERD General
Recommendation No. 19,
Racial segregation and apartheid (Art. 3) : 18
August 1995. The Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, states
“particularly condemn racial segregation and
apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and
eradicate all practices of this nature in
territories under their jurisdiction.” Article 3,
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination.
10.
Article 1, Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination.
11.
Robert
Miles, “Racism as a Concept” in Racism, Edts.
Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, Oxford University
Press, p. 351.
12.
David
Theo Goldberg, “The Semantics of Race,” in
Racism, Edts. Martin Bulmer and John Solomos,
Oxford University Press, p. 372.
13.
Article 2, Convention on the Suppression of the
Crime of Apartheid.
14.
Article 2, Convention on the Suppression of the
Crime of Apartheid.
[emphasis added]
15.
Article 2, Convention on the Suppression of the
Crime of Apartheid.
16.
Article 85(4), First Additional Protocol to the
Fourth Geneva Conventions, 1977.
17.
Article 7, Rome Satute of the ICC. [Emphasis added]
18.
See
Ronald C Slye, “Apartheid as a Crime Against
Humanity: A Submission to the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission,” 20 Michigan
Journal of International Law. 267, 1998-1999, p.
293.
19.
Article 3, Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
20.
Roger
S. Clark, “Apartheid,” International Criminal
Law, Second Edition, Volume I, Edt. M. Cherif
Bassiouni, 1991, p. 645.
21.
David
Theo Goldberg, “The Semantics of Race,” in
Racism, Edts. Martin Bulmer and John Solomos,
Oxford University Press, p. 370.
22.
“In
articulating as natural ways of being in the world
and the institutional structures in and through such
ways of being expressed, race both establishes and
rationalized the order of difference as a law of
nature.”David Theo Goldberg, “The Semantics of Race,”
in Racism, Edts. Martin Bulmer and John
Solomos, Oxford University Press, p. 374.
23.
Colette Guillaumin, “The changing face of Race,”
in Racism, Edts. Martin Bulmer and John
Solomos, Oxford University Press, p. 362.
24.
Colette Guillaumin, “The changing face of Race,”
in Racism, Edts. Martin Bulmer and John
Solomos, Oxford University Press, p. 362.
25.
Max
Weber [1922]1978 Economy and Society eds.
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim
Fischof, vol. 2 Berkeley: University of California
Press, p. 389.
26.
See
Roselle Tekiner, “Race and the Issue of National
Identity in Israel,” International Journal of
Middle East. Studies 23, 1991, p. 41,42.
On the relation between
racial and ethnic group see Robert Miles, “Racism as
a Concept” in Racism, Edts. Martin Bulmer and
John Solomos, Oxford University Press, p. 345.
Goldberg believes that
the concept of race is ethnocentric because
“ethnicity is the mode of cultural identification
and distinction.” David Theo Goldberg, “The
Semantics of Race,” in Racism, Edts.
Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, Oxford University
Press, p. 371.
27.
CERD
General Recommendation No. 08: Identification with a
particular racial or ethnic group (Art.1, par.1 &
4), 22 August 1990.
28.
Richard Jenkins, Social Identity, Second
Edition, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p. 5.
29.
Richard Jenkins, Social Identity, Second
Edition, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p.
18.
30.
David
Theo Goldberg,“Racial Palestinianization” in
Thinking Palestine, Ed. Ronit Lentin, Zed Books,
London & New York, 2008, p. 42.
31.
David
Theo Goldberg,“Racial Palestinianization” in
Thinking Palestine, Ed. Ronit Lentin, Zed Books,
London & New York, 2008, p. 33.
32.
Until
2000-2001, Israeli citizens' ID cards included a
section under the heading 'nationality' that
differentiated between Jews, Arabs, Druze, and
Circassian.
33.
Uri
Davis, Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for the
Struggle Within, Zed Books, London, 2003, p. 96.
34.
Uri
Davis, Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for the
Struggle Within, Zed Books, London, 2003, p.
107.
35.
Jerusalem ID cards are identical to those of Israeli
citizen, with the notable exception that those
Palestinians granted these cards in the year 1967
when the remainder of the city was occupied have ID
numbers that begin with 080, and Palestinians
granted these cards as a result of family
unification have ID numbers that begin with 086.
36.
Uri
Davis, Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for the
Struggle Within, Zed Books, London, 2003, p. 19.
37.
Report
of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a
component of the right to an adequate standard of
living, Mr, Miloon Kothari, E/CN.4/2003/5/Add.1,
June 2002, p. 4.
38.
Oren
Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, Land and Identity
Politics in Israel/Palestine, University of
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, p.8.
39.
Oren
Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, Land and Identity
Politics in Israel/Palestine, University of
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, p.8.
40.
Prior
to 1948, some of these plans were: Weizman Transfer
Scheme (1930), Soskin Plan of Compulsory Transfer
(1937), Royal (Peel) Commission recommendations
(transfer of Arabs to Transjordan) (1937), Weitz
Transfer Plan (1937), Bonne Scheme (1938),
al-Jazirah Scheme (second transfer committee)
(1938), Norman Transfer Plan to Iraq (1934-38),
Ben-Horin Plan (1943-48), Plan Dalet (1948).See for
instance Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the
Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist
Political Thought 1882-1948, Institute for
Palestine Studies, US, 1992.See also Ilan Pappe,
The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld,
Oxford, 2007.
Post 1948,
“Resettlement” plans (various resettlement plans
from the 1950s to the 1980s were elaborated to send
Palestinians to Arab states (Libya, Jordan and
El'Arish in Sinai Egypt) and Latin American
countries. Other plans included the "Allon Plan"
which called for Israel's annexation of up to half
the West Bank, while Palestinians would be confined
to the other half in two unconnected cantons to the
north and south (late 1960s), the Jewish Agency and
the World Zionist Organization Twenty-Year Plan
(1975-1995), Sharon Seven Stars Plan and
Trans-Israel Highway project (1977) calling for
contiguous Israeli urban growth straddling both
sides of the "Green Line"; Drobles Settlement Plan
(1980-85); Unilateral disengagement plan (2003) –
confirming Israel's intention to annex settlement
blocks as part of Israel.See Nur Masalha, A Land
Without a People, Israel, Transfer and the
Palestinians 1949-1996, Faber and Faber, London,
1997.See also Souad A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine,
A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli
Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine, Center
on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and
Refugee Rights, Bethlehem, 2005, p. 72-78.
On current talks about
transfer:In July 2001, a bill was proposed to
encourage the emigration of Palestinian citizens of
Israel on the grounds that “they do not identify
with the Jewish character of the state” and in order
to strengthen “Israel as a Jewish state and a
democracy.”Sultany, Nimer, Citizens Without
Citizenship. Mada’s First Annual Political
Monitoring Report: Israel and the Palestinian
Minority 2000–2002, Haifa: Mada, 2003, pp. 42–43. In
November 2004, the National Union party drafted a
bill (Person for Person Law 2004) proposing to
transfer one Palestinian from Israel to the OPT for
every Jewish settler removed from the OPT to Israel.
When this bill was rejected, it was replaced by a
new proposal (Disengagement Law 2004) that would
“organize the evacuation of residents of southern
Jerusalem.” According to the initiators, “the
transfer of Arabs from densely populated Jewish
areas will reduce the friction with the local
residents, and may improve the fabric of Jewish
life, the Jewish economy, and Jewish security.”
Israel and the Palestinian Minority 2004, Sultany,
Nimer (ed.), Mada’s Third Annual Political
Monitoring Report. Haifa: Mada, July 2005, p. 33. In
2006, the right-wing Herut political party in Israel
adopted as part of their electoral campaign the
slogan “A good Arab is not a dead Arab; a good Arab
sometimes wants to leave.” The slogan was
eventually barred by the Central Committee managing
the Israeli elections, although the party continued
to advocate for the transfer of Palestinians. See
Weekly Review of Human Rights Violations against the
Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel, No. 264/3–10
March 2006, Nazareth: Arab Association for Human
Rights, p. 3. For more, also See Jonathan Cook,
Blood and Religion, The Unmasking of the Jewish and
Democratic State, Pluto Press, London, 2006, pp.
118-122.
41.
See
Souad A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of
the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of
Land and Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem, 2005, p. 28, 73.
42.
See
Uri Davis, Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for
the Struggle Within, Zed Books, London, 2003;
John Quigly, “Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of
Israel,” Ind. and International
Comparative Law Review, 2, 1991-1992, p. 231.
43.
Law of
Return, Laws of the State of Israel, 1950.
44.
Citizenship Law, Law of the State of Israel, 1952.
Denial of the right of return through the
Citizenship Law is unlawful.For instance, CERD
urgent Israel “to assure equality in the right to
return to one’s country and in the possession of
property.” Concluding Observations of the Committee
on Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, 14 June
2007,para 18. For more on the de-nationalization of
Palestinian refugees, see Gail J. Boiling, The 1948
Palestinian Refugees and the Individual Right of
Return, An International Law Analysis, Badil
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and
Refugees Rights, Bethlehem, Second Edition, July
2007, pp. 42-44.
45.
John
Quigly, “Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of
Israel,” Ind. and International
Comparative Law Review, 2, 1991-1992, p. 231.
46.
Ensuring Rejection of the Right of Return Law,
2001.In explaining the motive for the proposed bill
during preliminary readings on 17 May 2000, MK
Yisrael Katz said “the bill reflects a Zionist
consensus not to allow the refugees of 1948 and 1967
to return to the sovereign areas of the State of
Israel.....whoever wishes to live in a democracy and
in equality – will find a place with us. Whoever
seeks another national identity – let him go
elsewhere. The right of return, a state for all its
citizens – are expressions synonymous to the wish to
destroy Israel.” In Nimer Sultany, Citizens without
Citizenship, Mada's First Annual Political
Monitoring Report: Israel and the Palestinian
Minority 2000-2002, Mada – Arab Center for Applied
Social Research, Haifa, 2003, pp. 19-20.
47.
(Temporary Order) of 31 May 2003.
48.
“The
Committee notes with concern the application in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories of different laws,
policies and practices applied to Palestinians on
the one hand, and to Israelis on the other hand.”
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Racial
Discrimination, CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, 14 June 2007,para
35.
49.
Souad
A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of the
Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land
and Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem, 2005, p. 72.
50.
“The
JNF has become a private Israeli company since 1953
according to a special law enacted by the Knesset
known as the Israel National Fund Law of 1953.
according to its memorandum the JNF acts within any
area under the jurisdiction of the Government of
Israel and for the benefit of Jews only, and in the
case of dissolution of the JNF, all its property
will be transferred to the Israeli Government. It is
estimated that the JNF owns around 13 percent of the
lands in Israel. In addition to the JNF Law, in 1953
the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) enacted the World
Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency (Status)
Law. According to Article 4 of this law, these two
“national organizations” have been recognized by the
state of Israel as allowed “to continue acting in
Israel to develop the state and its inhabitants, and
to settle immigrants from the diaspora....” Usama
Halabi, Israel's Land Laws as a Legal-Political
Tool, Working Paper No. 7, Badil Resource Center for
Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Bethlehem,
December 2004, p. 3. See also Uri Davis,
Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for the
struggle within, Zed Books, London, 2003, pp.
40-52.
51.
See
John Quigly, “Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of
Israel,” Ind. and International
Comparative Law Review, 2, 1991-1992, p. 234.See
Usama Halabi, Israel's Land Laws as a
Legal-Political Tool, Working Paper No. 7, Badil
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and
Refugee Rights, Bethlehem, December 2004, p. 6.
52.
Uri
Davis, Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for
the struggle within, Zed Books, London, 2003, p.
41.
53.
See
Uri Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State, Zed
Books, London, 1987, pp. 55-57.
54.
Souad
A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of the
Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land
and Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem, 2005, p. 57.
55.
See
Uri Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State, Zed
Books, London, 1987, pp. 55-57.
56.
Jonathan Cook, Blood and Religion, The Unmasking
of the Jewish and Democratic State, Pluto Press,
London, 2006, p. 17.
57.
See
Usama Halabi, Israel's Land Laws as a
Legal-Political Tool, Working Paper No. 7, Badil
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and
Refugee Rights, Bethlehem, December 2004, p. 3.
58.
Uri
Davis, Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for
the struggle within, Zed Books, London, 2003, p.
46.See also Souad A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A
History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli
Seizure of Land and Housing in Palestine, Center
on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil
Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and
Refugee Rights, Bethlehem, 2005, p. 57, 75.
59.
Souad
A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of the
Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land
and Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem, 2005, p. 71.
60.
Emergency Regulation Concerning Absentee Property,
1948 and later the Absentee Property Law 1950.Other
laws are also used to expropriate Palestinian land
such as the 1953 Land Acquisition (Validity of Acts
and Compensation) Law and the 1943 Lands
(Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance, which
although neutral, has been discriminatory. All lands
taken under the 1943 Ordinance have become part of
the state property according to the 1951 State
Property Law. For more, see Usama Halabi, Israel's
Land Laws as a Legal-Political Tool, Working Paper
No. 7, Badil Resource Center for Palestinian
Residency and Refugee Rights, Bethlehem, December
2004, p. 5.
61.
According to the law, absentees are (1) a person who
between 29th November 1947 and 19th
May 1948 has ceased to exist, was a legal owner of
any property situated in the area of Israel or
enjoyed or held it, whether by himself or through
another, and who, at any time during this period was
a national or citizen of Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Trans-Jordan, Iraq or the Yemen or was in
one of these countries or in any part of Palestine
outside the area of Israel or was a Palestinian
citizen and left his ordinary place of residence in
Palestine for a place outside Palestine before 1sr
September 1948 or for a place in Palestine held at
that time by forces which sought to prevent the
establishment of the state of Israel or which fought
against its establishment; (2) a body of persons
which, at any time during the period specified in
paragraph (1), was a legal owner of any property
situated in the area of Israel or enjoyed or held
such property, whether by itself or through another,
and all the members, partners, shareholders,
directors or managers of which are absentees within
the meaning of paragraph (1), or the management of
the business of which is otherwise decisively
controlled such absentees, or all the capital which
is in the hands of such absentees. The Absentees’
Property Law, 5710-1950 in Souad A. Dajani,
Ruling Palestine, A History of the Legally
Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land and
Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing Rights
and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource Center for
Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Bethlehem,
2005, p. 41.
62.
Souad
A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of the
Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land
and Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem, 2005, p. 41.
63.
Souad
A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of the
Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land
and Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem, 2005, p. 85.
64.
Souad
A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of the
Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land
and Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem, 2005, p. 85.
65.
Souad
A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of the
Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land
and Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem, 2005, p. 85.
66.
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, 1976, Article 2. See John
Quigly, “Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of
Israel,” Ind. and International
Comparative Law Review, 2, 1991-1992, p. 234.
67.
John
Quigly, “Apartheid Outside Africa: The Case of
Israel,” Ind. and International
Comparative Law Review, 2, 1991-1992, p. 236.
68.
Only
in Area C in the OPT, Israel has demolished 1,600
houses between January 2000 and September 2007and
3,000 houses have received demolition orders and
could be demolished at any moment. See UN OCHA,
““Lack of Permit” Demolitions and Resultant
Displacement in Area C,” OCHA Special Focus, May
2008. House demolition and forced evictions are
implemented through a number of practices such as
collective punishment and demolitions for so-called
lack of building permit and military orders.
69.
UN
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the
right to an adequate standard of living, Mr. Miloon
Kothari, Fifty-ninth session, E/CN.4/2003/5/Add.1,
12 June 2002, para. 22.
70.
UN
Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations;
Israel, 2001.
71.
In
2005, Minister of Justice, Tzipi Livni, confirmed
that "the wall is the future border of the state of
Israel" and that "the High Court of Justice, in its
ruling over the fence, is drawing the country's
border.” Haaretz, 1 December 2005.
“Israel's separation barrier in and around Jerusalem
is meant to ensure a Jewish majority in the disputed
city, a Cabinet minister acknowledged Monday,
contradicting government claims that the divider is
solely a temporary security measure. Haim Ramon, the
Israeli Cabinet minister for Jerusalem, told Israel
Radio the barrier is not only making the city safer
by buffering against suicide bombers, but "also
makes it more Jewish.” “Israeli Official: Wall to
Ensure Jewish Majority,” Fox News, 11 July
2005.
72.
The International Court of Justice in its advisory
opinion the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory in July 2004 reached a similar
conclusion because .”..a significant number of
Palestinians have already been compelled by the
construction of the wall and its associated regime
to depart from certain areas, a process that will
continue as more of the wall is built, that
construction, coupled with the establishment of the
Israeli settlements […] is tending to alter the
demographic composition of the [occupied Palestinian
territory].” International Court of Justice,
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 133.
“Actions that change
the demographic composition of the Occupied
Palestinian Territories are also of concern as
violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law.”Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Racial Discrimination,
CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, 14 June 2007,para 14.
“The ICRC also conveyed
its concern to the Israeli authorities about the
legal and humanitarian implications of the West Bank
barrier, particularly the destruction or
expropriation of Palestinian property and land and
the forced displacement and isolation of Palestinian
communities living in its path or vicinity.”ICRC
Annual report 2004, p. 285.
73.
For
more on the Military Rule system, see Sabri Jiryis,
The Arabs in Israel, Beirut: Institute of
Palestine Studies, 1966.
74.
Souad
A. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of the
Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure of Land
and Housing in Palestine, Center on Housing
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
Bethlehem, 2005, p. 63.
75.
See
Oren Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, Land and
Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine,
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, p.4.
76.
In
November 2004, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided
to create an emergency plan to “save the outlying
areas” in the Naqab and Galilee. The plan is
intended to increase land held by the Jewish
population and ensure a Jewish majority in the Naqab
(Negev) and Galilee. See Mada al-Carmel, The Arab
Center for Applied Social Research, Israel and
the Palestinian Minority 2004, Sultany, Nimer,
(ed.), Mada’s Third Annual Political Monitoring
Report, pp.41-42.
See also Arab Association for Human Rights,
'Bedouins in the Negev, fact sheetand the Regional
Council for the Unrecognized Villages in the Negev.
“In November 2005, the
government adopted the Negev 2015 plan, a US$3.6
billion 10-year scheme aimed at increasing the
Jewish population of the Negev by 200,000 by
developing upscale residential neighborhoods, fast
transportation networks for commuters, high tech
establishments, and better educational facilities.
While the plan does propose upgrades to the
appalling infrastructure and educational facilities
in the government-planned Bedouin townships, it
completely ignores the needs of the Bedouin living
in unrecognized villages in the Negev.” “Israeli
officials insist that Bedouin can relocate to seven
existing government-planned townships. But in fact
alternative housing there is not readily available,
and these towns are currently ill-equipped to handle
a further influx of residents. Most Bedouin reject
the idea of relocating to the townships, where
poverty and crime rates are high, basic
socioeconomic infrastructure is lacking, and they
cannot continue traditional means of livelihood such
as herding and grazing. Most important, the state
requires Bedouin who move to the townships to
renounce their ancestral land claims, which is
unthinkable for most Bedouin who have such claims to
land.” Human Rights Watch, Off the Map Land and
Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized
Bedouin Villages, Volume 20, No. 5 (E),March 2008,
pp. 4, 5.
CERD recommended that
Israel “enquire into possible alternatives to the
relocation of inhabitants of unrecognized Bedouin
villages in the Negev/Naqab to planned towns, in
particular through the recognition of these villages
and the recognition of the rights of the Bedouins to
own, develop, control and use their communal lands,
territories and resources traditionally owned or
otherwise inhabited or used by them. It recommends
that the State party enhance its efforts to consult
with the inhabitants of the villages and notes that
it should in any case obtain the free and informed
consent of affected communities prior to such
relocation.” Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/ISR/CO/13,
14 June 2007,para 25.
77.
Bedouin comprise 25 percent of the population of the
northern Negev (Naqab), but have jurisdiction over
less than 2 percent of the land there.“Israeli
officials contend that they are merely enforcing
zoning and building codes, but the state
systematically demolishes Bedouin homes while
overlooking or retroactively legalizing illegal
construction by Jewish citizens.”Human Rights Watch,
Off the Map Land and Housing Rights Violations in
Israel’s Unrecognized Bedouin Villages, Volume 20,
No. 5 (E),March 2008, p. 5.
78.
Human
Rights Watch, Off the Map Land and Housing Rights
Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized Bedouin
Villages, Volume 20, No. 5 (E),March 2008, p. 5.
79.
Comments by Yaron Levy, secretary of Moshav Nir Zvi
regarding the separation wall between the moshav and
Pardes Snir neighbourhood in the city of Lid.Larry
Ben-David, “The Separation Wall within the Green
Line,” Ma'ariv Online, 3 March 2003 (in
Hebrew) cited in Behind the Walls, Separation Wall
between Arabs and Jews in Mixed Cities and
neighbourhoods in Israel, Arab Association for Human
Rights, Nazareth, December 2005, p. 18. See also
Jonathan Cook, Blood and Religion, The Unmasking
of the Jewish and Democratic State, Pluto Press,
London, 2006, p. 4.
80.
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Racial
Discrimination, CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, 14 June 2007, para
22.
81.
Uri
Davis, Apartheid Israel, Possibilities for
the struggle within, Zed Books, London, 2003, p.
2. |